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Abstract – This paper explores the factors underlying the differences that exist
between immigrants and natives in the selective process at work in the transition
from lower to upper secondary school in France. The analysis shows that the
academic performance of immigrants and natives is unequal. This imbalance, in
addition to the inadequate understanding of how the school system functions and
the time passed since arriving in the host country, sufficiently accounts for the
initial inter-group variation in grades. After controlling for class and immigration
related variables, ethnicity was found to have a minor role in the explanation of
educational differentials between immigrants and natives. This contradicts the
prominent role given to ethnic ascription by the most recent theorising on
differentials in status attainment between immigrants and natives.
Introduction
mmigrants’ disadvantage in education is a well-documented phenomenon in
advanced democracies. Immigrants show lower rates of academic performance in
comparison to natives (Marks, 2005). They also have high dropout rates and rarely
pursue higher types of education (Portes & MacLeod, 1996; Driesen & Geert,
2000). The specialised literature depicts ethnicity, altogether with class, as a
significant ascriptive source of educational disadvantage.
France is not an exception (Vallet & Caille, 1996). This is not a minor problem
because the proportion of French-born citizens and residents sharing a foreign
origin had reached 13.5 million by the end of the last decade (i.e., between one-
fifth and one-fourth of the whole French population) (Tribalat, 2004). Over the last
forty years, France has moreover consistently increased its net rate of social
mobility (Vallet, 1999). In fact, as a consequence of several educational reforms,
recent research on social mobility has placed France on a par with Sweden and the
Netherlands in terms of absolute social mobility rates (Vallet, 2004). The question
though is whether these changes have managed to erase the existing gap between
immigrants and natives.
The conclusions reached so far by the French empirical literature on
immigration and educational attainment are diverse. Some scholars have argued
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2that, controlling for class, foreign born populations living in France
underachieve in comparison to natives (Thélot & Vallet, 1994). In contrast,
others have concluded that immigrants are better off than natives (Mondon,
1984). The most comprehensive study in the field by Vallet & Caille (1996)
concluded that, controlling for class, the immigrant population did not show any
disadvantage. The present article follows this debate and tries to clarify the
existing relationship between class and ethnicity. It also seeks to unravel the
mechanisms responsible for ethnic differentials in status attainment, since the
statistical significance of the ethnic parameters in multivariate analysis is
nothing more than a black-box explanation that must be avoided due to its
analytical obscurity.
This paper, which explores the educational performance of immigrants in
secondary education, focuses in particular on the transition from lower to upper
secondary school. I begin the paper by briefly reviewing the literature on class and
ethnic differentials in education. I then present an empirical analysis that shows
how immigrants and natives differ in the rates of access to non-compulsory
secondary education (i.e., upper secondary school). In the next section, the
unequal school performance of immigrants and natives is identified as the major
factor behind the differences in the school careers at upper secondary level. This
realisation leads me to examine then the group differentials in the grades obtained
in lower secondary school. The final section explains these differentials through
a combination of class mechanisms and a number of constraints linked to
immigration, such as the poorer knowledge of how the school system functions
and the year of arrival in the host country.
The insights that emerge from the present analysis indicate that there are few
traces of ethnic disadvantage. It follows that the emphasis given to ethnicity in
many of the recent explanations of the educational underperformance of
immigrants needs to be rethought in order to possibly provide simpler and more
parsimonious explanations.
Class and ethnic disadvantage: the theoretical references
The American sociology of ethnicity has been the main source of theoretical
inspiration for European scholars of ethnic disadvantage. The most recent and
prominent theoretical production is strongly inspired by the hindering role of
ethnicity (Borjas, 1992, 1995; Portes & Zhou, 1993; Portes & Rumbaut 1996) and
the existence of intra-group interactions that constrain individual chances (Borjas,
1995; Portes & Hao, 2005). Most of these theories claim that there is something
intrinsic to ethnic membership that shapes individual life chances in the host
3country. This would imply a kind of essentialism that marks individuals across
ethnic groups.
The broad irruption of sociological explanations based on the concept of social
capital (see Portes, 1998) has clearly influenced this line of reasoning. Moreover,
it has favoured non-parsimonious explanations which generally assume that
differentials between immigrants and natives in status attainment are provoked by
ethnic-related causes instead of other factors, such as the unequal distribution of
immigrants in the class structure. Contrary to this general trend, this paper argues
that the role of ethnicity can only be properly assessed after controlling for both
class and immigration related variables. Unfortunately, the literature on ethnic
inequalities in status attainment is not in constant dialogue with other branches of
sociology that focus on similar dependent variables. Sociologists of ethnic
disadvantage must consequently widen their scope to incorporate in more detail
the theoretical production and empirical findings of the literature that studies non-
ethnic inequalities.
Without any normative implication, a scenario is defined as free of ethnic
disadvantage when the educational differentials between immigrants and natives
are due to the unequal class stratification of these two groups (and, in its case, by
immigration related variables), but not to ethnic factors. This argument is
anchored in the finding that the individual stock of human capital is not perfectly
portable as part of it is country-specific (Friedberg, 1996). Immigrants may thus
need a period of adaptation to overcome this handicap that is linked to the
migration process itself (Chiswick, 1988).
FIGURE 1: Possible scenarios that cause educational differentials
4Figure 1 presents two different explanations for educational differentials. Let
us first describe the scenario where ethnicity does not account for the different
level of attainment (i.e., arrow no. 1). In this case, class is the only source of
educational differentials. This means that immigrants are stratified according to
their class of origin plus a discount factor ∂ (∂ = 1 for natives and ∂ ≤ 1 for
immigrants). This discount factor introduces the effect of the handicap derived
from the status of being immigrant. ∂ is a function of several variables – such as,
having been born in the host society or elsewhere and the type of parental couple,
whether it is made up of two immigrants or an immigrant and a native (i.e., mixed)
(Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004). If class and immigration do not represent a
complete account of educational differentials between immigrants and natives,
then ethnicity may play a significant role (i.e., arrow no. 2).
Different theoretical frameworks can apply to each of these two scenarios. The
literature on class differentials in education identifies a plethora of causal
mechanisms, such as material and cultural deprivation and different tastes for
education. Material inequalities can still be a cause of disadvantage, even in
advanced societies where the direct costs of education are null up to upper
secondary school. Although the effect of social origins on the transition from
primary to secondary education declined as the completion of secondary
education became a universal possibility in many countries, the social selectivity
of the educational system did not disappear with regard to access to upper
secondary education (Raftery & Hout, 1993). For whenever a certain level of
education is universal, the class conflict is replicated in the following stage
because individuals relentlessly accumulate resources to face further competition
(Lucas, 2001).
Cultural inequalities are also frequently cited as a relevant factor in the study
of educational disadvantage. Bourdieu argued that the distribution of cultural
capital is unequal among classes. This happens because of the different disposition
that generates practice in accordance with the structural principles of the social
world (habitus). These disparities are, at the same time, due to diverging
socialisation practices across social groups (Bourdieu, 1974; Bourdieu &
Passeron, 1977). The empirical literature has confirmed that unequal stocks of
cultural resources shape educational outcomes (Halsey, Heath & Ridge, 1980; Di
Maggio, 1982; De Graaf, 1986; Sullivan, 2001)1.
The third main block of explanations for the existence of inter-group
differentials in education highlights the importance of preferences for education.
Some authors argue that individuals from more privileged social strata value
education more strongly than those coming from deprived contexts (Pearlin, 1971;
Willis, 1977; Murphy, 1981, 1990; Gambetta, 1987). In contrast, other scholars
support the view that preferences for education are homogeneous across groups,
5and that groups differ only in the social distance they have to cover in order to
reach similar goals or in their aversion to risk (Boudon, 1974; Breen &
Goldthorpe, 1997).
In spite of the pre-eminence in the debate on the heterogeneity of preferences
for education across social groups, there is sufficient empirical evidence to reject
the hypothesis of immigrants’ under-ambition with respect to natives. Immigrant
families hold high educational expectations with regard to their children’s
education (Muller & Kerbow, 1993; Kao & Tienda, 1995; Vallet & Caille, 1996).
It is thus rather unlikely that the unequal distribution of preferences for education
is responsible for the poorer educational performance of immigrant groups in
relation to the native population.
If class of origin and immigration leave any unexplained variation in the
educational attainment of these two groups, ethnicity may play a significant role.
The literature on ethnic disadvantage has also identified several mechanisms that
may account for ethnic differentials in socio-economic status including diverging
cultural predisposition towards effort, discrimination and broader factors that
differentiate collective dynamics. Culture is maybe the most well known among
them. Following the Weberian logic of the Protestant ethic (see Weber, 1985),
some suggest that certain cultural constructs are plagued by absenteeism, tardiness
or the rejection of effort, while others hold values that enhance the likelihood of
success (Sowell, 1981, 1996; Jelen, 1993).
On the contrary, a number of scholars think that the roots of ethnic
disadvantage are situational and that discrimination is the key to explaining group
differentials (Steinberg, 1981). Discrimination can happen at the school level
(Troyna & Carrington, 1990) or at the labour market level if there are different
returns to education (Heath & MacMahon, 1998; Betts & Lofstrom, 2000).
More recent theorising on the effect of ethnicity on status attainment tried to
overcome the traditional dichotomy between culture and discrimination. This is
what Chiswick (1988) does in his child investment model, inspired by the widely
accepted trade off between quantity and quality of children. In this model, what
is specific to ethnic minorities is that fertility control may have a different
psychological cost across ethnic boundaries, depending on the religious credo in
which the group is embedded. Nonetheless, Chiswick also suggests that the
importance of religion may vary from generation to generation. A different
argument came from Borjas (1992), who defined the concept of ethnic capital. For
Borjas, ethnicity is an externality in the human capital accumulation process
which operates through what he calls ethnic capital. Ethnic capital refers to the
quality of the ethnic environment – the average level of human capital – where the
immigrants and the children of immigrants are raised (Borjas 1992). Finally, the
celebrated Ωodes of incorporation by Portes & Rumbuat (1996) hypothesise that
6the way in which first-movers are incorporated into the host society shapes the
status attainment of future-comers and second generations. The modes are a
function of the immigration policies at work against specific groups and their
ability to neutralise it through their social capital.
Data and categories for this study
Research on ethnic minorities is hindered by the lack of datasets that are
sufficiently large to make inter-group comparisons. France has a long tradition in
the production of datasets for the study of all sorts of inequalities in education. For
instance, the recent Panel d’Élèves du Second Degré (Panel 95) includes in its
recruitment questionnaire (1995) explicit information about the family’s
migration history and allows a proper study of ethnic disadvantage in education
(see Caille, 2003).
The survey sampled 18,730 students entering into lower secondary education
– the collège – in 1995. The information was collected in several stages.
Unfortunately, the sampling design is a source of lost cases. A ‘recruitment
questionnaire’ was filled up with administrative data for each student in 1995.
Each year from 1995 to 2000, a questionnaire surveyed the students’ school
performance. In 1998, a ‘family questionnaire’ extracted more information about
the students’ family entourage. Approximately 12,981 completed this
questionnaire2. In spite of the fact that the survey did not over-sampled ethnic
minorities, it still provides adequate figures for this study.
TABLE 1: Type of student by immigration category
  Immigration Categories
Children of father and mother born in France (French) 12,672 72.19
First generation/mixed parental couple (first-mixed) 87 0.50
First generation/immigrant parental couple (first-immigrant) 426 2.43
Second generation/mixed parental couple (second-mixed) 2,381 13.56
Second generation/immigrant parental couple
(second-immigrant) 1,987 11.32
Total 17,553 100.00
Source: Panel 95
PercentageFrequency
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own country of birth. The French-born type, or natives, are children of a French-
born father and mother. First and second generation type immigrants can be from
mixed (immigrant + French) or immigrant (immigrant + immigrant) parental
couples. The logic behind the inclusion of these categories is fairly common in the
specialised literature. Being born in the host country has a potentially beneficial
effect because the individual’s early socialisation happens already in the receiving
context (Borjas, 1992; Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004). For similar reasons,
mixed parental couples – which are a well-known context for acculturation and
increasing integration and understanding of the functioning of the host society –
have an effect on any indicator from religious practise to language proficiency
(Tribalat, 1995; Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004).
Ethnicity is defined according to the parental country of birth. The children of
mixed parental couples are grouped following the ethnic background of their non-
native parent. Table 2 gives the ethnicity of the students sampled in Panel 95. Although
in some cases the sub-samples by ethnic origin were small, it was decided to include
the maximum number of ethnic groups available in order to have sufficient inter-group
variation in terms of cultural background and immigration histories.
Ethnic Group  Frequency Percentage
France 12,672 80.19
Algeria 828 5.24
Spain 148 0.94
Northern Europe3 184 1.16
Indochina4 154 0.97
Italy 124 0.78
Morocco 614 3.89
Portugal 391 2.47
Sub-Saharan Africa5 316 2.00
Tunisia 240 1.52
Turkey 131 0.83
Total 15,802 100.00
Source: Panel 95. There were 1751 immigrants whose ethnic group was not sufficiently
numerically relevant to be included in the analysis.
TABLE 2: Ethnic groups (father/mother’s country of birth)
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Differences in the track chosen in upper secondary school
Secondary schooling in France is divided into two blocks: lower secondary
education (i.e., the collège: 6th to 3rd year for ages from 11 to 16) is compulsory
and universal, but upper secondary education is a track system (i.e., the lycée: 2nd
to final year). At the end of lower secondary school, a board formed by teachers
and inspectors (class council) decides which track the student is invited to follow
in upper secondary. The decision is made within the so-called orientation process.
This selective process, which is becoming increasingly more demanding, is the
cornerstone of the French school system (Prost, 1992). The orientation process
begins when the students’ families express their preferred option. The class
council makes the final decision in the light of the family’s preference and the
student’s performance in lower secondary school. Although this very rarely
happens, in case of disagreement with the final decision, the families can launch
an objection, thus opening an administrative process (Masson, 1997). Some
French authors have criticised this process for amplifying the effect of family level
constraints leading to inequality (Duru-Bellat & Kieffer, 2000; Merle, 2002). In
the 1990s, some 89.3% of the children from top-executive classes followed the
upper track, compared to only 54.6% from a manual background. Again, while
65.1% of French natives proceeded to the academic track, only 51.7% did so
among the immigrant students (Duru-Bellat & Mingat, 1990)6. Some sociologists
have argued that the family’s expectations work as a ‘binding information’ and this
is why students from lower social strata have a greater likelihood of being sent
to the vocational option rather than to the more academic one (Duru-Bellat
& Mingat, 1985, 1988).
Two different dependent variables were used to study this process: one for the
family’s preference and another one for the final decision made by the class
council. A dummy variable family-choice is set to 1 if the first option desired by
the family at the beginning of the orientation process is the academic track, and
0 if otherwise. Merle (2002) has argued that the study of the democratisation of
access to upper secondary education in France cannot focus on leaving or staying
at school after the collège period, but has to take into account the different tracks
followed as deprived families are more likely to prefer shorter and more applied
educational options.
Table 3 introduces stepwise the ethnic (M1) and immigrant (M2) groups
to measure group differentials in the likelihood of choosing either of these
two tracks with respect to the children of French-born families (reference
category).
9TABLE 3: LOGIT – family’s first wish in the orientation process
The column marked M3 introduces information about the household income.
Indeed, families may differ in their willingness to make economic sacrifices for
their children’s education (Hauser, 1993; Kane 1994). The value of the variable
income is set to 1 when the respondent to the ‘family questionnaire’ thinks that the
resources available at the household level are ‘very insufficient’ for the student to
continue his studies for as long as he wants (it is set to 2 if considered
‘insufficient’, to 3 if ‘sufficient’, and to 4 if ‘perfectly sufficient’). Given the non-
linear effect of this variable, it is introduced in its logarithmic form.
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Finally, the column marked M4 introduces a complete set of academic-
performance controls. The literature has shown that the student’s subjective
perception about the probability of succeeding is a determinant factor in the
educational choices decided within families (Morgan, 1998; Breen, 1999). The
variable level-family-estimation is the family’s estimation about the student’s
performance7. To correct for any information deficiency about the student’s
performance, the model also controls for the mean grade obtained in the
examinations that take place at the end of lower secondary school (i.e., the brevet
des collèges). The mean-brevet ranges from 0 to 20, and the number of years that
the student has repeated in lower secondary education (i.e., repeats-collège)
ranges from 0 to 6.
The first model (M1) reveals a strong pattern of ethnic disadvantage. The
Algerian, Moroccan, Portuguese, Tunisian and Turkish groups are significantly
less likely to wish their offspring to follow the academic track. Also, most of the
non-significant ethnic groups hold negative signs (African, Italian and Spanish) –
the Indochinese and the Northern groups are the only two exceptions.
Nevertheless, the second model (M2) shows that this predominance of negative
signs is mostly due to different migration experiences rather than to ethnic
membership. Students coming from non-mixed parental couples are the most
likely to be sent to the vocational track. The second generation immigrant students
from mixed parental couples are also significantly more likely to do so, but this
effect is clearly smaller in size. The third model (M3) shows that these differences
are not clearly explained by the different economic resources that each household
devotes to education. Although the sign obtained for log(income) is the predicted
one, the third column demonstrates its scant effect on the immigration categories,
which remain highly significant.
The last column (M4) shows that after controlling for the student’s school
performance, the Africans (positive correlation) are the only ethnic group to
present any significant difference with respect to the native population. Again,
students coming from exclusively immigrant parental couples remain
significantly less likely to follow the academic track. Thus, contrary to what the
cultural literature on ethnic constraints suggests8, the present results provide no
empirical grounds for arguing that ethnic groups differ in their preferences for
education. In any case, the differences that remain significant after controlling for
academic merit are mostly an immigration effect, but not an ethnic one9.
The weaker students may drop out before reaching the end of lower secondary
education. If this is the case, the above models can suffer from an endogenous
selection bias. For that reason, these models were re-run using bi-probit estimation
in STATA 8.2. This is an application of the well-known Heckman’s selection
models. This technique is able to correct for potential biases derived from a
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deficient measurement in the dependent variables, such a dropouts. It improves the
estimation by enlarging the sample with those cases where the dependent variable
is lost. But no changes were detected with respect to sign and statistical
significance10.
We now examine the school board’s final decision. The dummy variable final-
choice is set to 1 when the final decision taken by the class council is the academic
option, and 0 if otherwise. The same protocol as in the previous analysis was
followed. Thus, after first introducing ethnic membership, the immigrant status
TABLE 4: LOGIT – final choice in the selection process at the end of the lower
secondary school
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variables were introduced. Following this, the model included two measures of
successful school outcomes: the number of times any course was repeated in lower
secondary school (the repeats-collège ranging from 0 to 6) and the grades obtained
in the general examinations taken in the 3rd year (the mean-brevet ranging from
0 to 20). Finally, the family’s preferred option expressed at the beginning of the
process was introduced in order to test if this preference has a determinant effect
on the board’s decision, thus reinforcing the constraints placed at the household
level.
The results shown in Table 4 are somewhat similar to those in Table 3. The first
model (M1) shows a clear pattern of ethnic disadvantage: the vast majority of the
groups hold negative signs, even if only the Algerian, Moroccan, Portuguese and
Turkish coefficients are significantly negative. These negative signs disappear,
however, after controlling for the dummies for the immigration categories (M2).
In fact, with the only exception of the Turkish, all groups become either non-
significant or significantly positive. Although the larger disadvantage exists
among the students coming from non-mixed parental couples, second-mixed is
also a moderate source of disadvantage. Not surprisingly, after controlling for the
student’s previous academic performance (M3), there is no unexplained variance
among ethnic and immigrant groups. The Moroccan coefficient is now
significantly positive. As can be seen the ethnic and immigration disadvantage
disappears without making further reference to any additional factor.
The fourth model (M4) shows that the track which any native or immigrant
student will follow in upper secondary school is simply a function of his
performance in the brevet examinations and his family’s wishes (which depend in
turn on the family’s impression about his or her academic success)11. The graph
in Figure 2 shows the determinant effect of the family’s first choice on the final
decision made by the class council12.
As this graph shows, the probability of following the academic track is higher
than that of being sent to the vocational one when the grades obtained in the brevet
examinations reach the value of seven for the families that expressed the
preference for the academic track, while it is over twelve for those that preferred
vocational education. This gap of five points shows how the family’s preferences
work as a shaping element of the final school decision.
These models were also re-estimated using bi-probit selection models. Again,
no changes were detected with respect to sign and statistical significance13.
In sum, school results (i.e., grades) are the main reason for the unequal
distribution of immigrant and native students in the academic-vocational tracks in
upper secondary school. This confirms the findings of previous studies of high
school choices arguing that pre-high school academic performance is a key
variable determining future educational paths (Zietz & Joshi, 2005).
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Consequently, the crucial question is why immigrants obtain lower grades in
secondary school.
Differences in school performance: grades in French language
At the beginning of lower secondary school, the students undergo a number of
evaluation examinations in order to make the teachers aware of possible
deficiencies and particular needs that should be addressed before entering upper
secondary school. The study of grades is normally done using the registers from
mathematics and language14. Panel 95 collected information on the grades
obtained in examinations in both subjects at several points in time15. This paper
only includes the results of the analysis for French language16. The grades in
French ranged from 0 to 78.
Table 5 presents the results of a number of linear regression analyses. While
column M1 includes ethnic groups, column M2 controls for the immigration
dummies. The third model (M3) controls for a number of class related factors. For
the sake of analytical clarity, class was not operationalised using any of the
standard class schemes that are built from the head of the household’s occupation.
FIGURE 2: The effect of school performance on the probability of following the
academic track across family’s preferences
Source: M4 in Table 4. The remaining independent variables and controls are set equal to the mean
value given in the sample included in the models.
14
Instead, it was decided to use some of its most widely accepted proxies in the field
of class differentials in education.
Income, accommodation, siblings and mother-works capture the constraining
effect of material-economic-disadvantage on educational attainment.
• Log(income) corresponds to the variable already presented in the previous
section. Recall that income is only the respondent’s view about the
sufficiency of the economic resources available at household level for the
student to continue studying for as long as he or she wants to (variable values
are set from 1 to 4, with 1 representing ‘not sufficient’ and 4 representing
‘perfectly sufficient’). As such, this variable is appropriate for the analysis
of the family’s preferences in upper secondary school. But a finer approach
is required for the study of school attainment, because the mechanisms in
place could be less evident. For this reason another control corrects for any
bias, such as, unequal family willingness of affording the material costs of
education across groups.
• Accommodation measures the respondent’s satisfaction with the family
residence (variable values are set from 1 to 4, with 1 representing ‘not at all
satisfied’ and 4 representing ‘very satisfied’). In order to control for the
possible bias linked to the different availability of space in rural and urban
areas, it was decided to introduce town-size which registers the population in
the family’s area of residence. Town-size ranges from 0 (rural area of less than
5000 inhabitants) to 7 (cities with less than two million inhabitants); the value
assigned to Greater Paris is 8.
In order to control for the beneficial effects of cultural resources existing at the
household level, the ‘parental level of education’ and the ‘consumption of
highbrow activities’ was included. The concept of cultural capital has traditionally
been operationalised in many different ways because of the obscurity of
Bourdieu’s work (Jenkins, 1989). An effort was made to capture the effect of the
elusive concept of cultural capital by the combination of two variables.
• Father’s education introduces the highest diploma obtained by the father17.
Although taking the father’s education as a proxy for cultural capital maybe is
not the finest option, it is a common practise in the literature (Halsey, Heath
& Ridge, 1980)18.
• Another way of thinking of cultural capital is by attendance at highbrow
cultural activities (De Graaf, 1986). Art-activities is a dummy variable that is
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TABLE 5: OLS – grades in French in the evaluation examinations (i)
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given value 1 if the student has attended any of these activities: conservatories,
school of music and dancing, youth cultural associations and courses of artistic
disciplines in 1998. The survey did not include information about parental
attendance at this type of activities. It was assumed that the correlation
between the children’s attendance at these activities and the parents’ cultural
capital is likely to be strong.
Finally, the student was assigned value 1 if female and value 0 if male. This
sex distinction was based on the understanding that women tend to show higher
educational results than men (see Tizard el al., 1988; Entwisle, Alexander &
Olson, 1994).
The column M1 signals the existence of a significant degree of ethnic
disadvantage: the results of Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Italians, Turks,
Portuguese and Black Africans in French are significantly worse than those of
native students. For the Spanish the sign is also significantly negative, but it is
close to the consensual level of statistical significance. As before, the subsequent
models try to provide an explanation for this finding.
The second model (M2) shows how this initial disadvantage is absorbed by
the variables that measure the immigration characteristics. The size of the
ethnic parameters decreases enormously and many of them become not
significant. Only the Turks remain significantly negative, while the
Indochinese and the Northern European immigrants present positive and
significant coefficients. As for the immigration categories, again those
students coming from immigrant + immigrant parental couples suffer greater
disadvantage, especially for first generation ones. Second generation
immigrant students from mixed parental couples also obtain lower grades in
French than the children of French-born families, but this effect is not
significant. Finally, the third model (M3) shows that stratification effects
absorb part of the immigration effect. After controlling for class factors, none
of the ethnic statistically significant coefficients present negative signs. This
indicates that the underperformance of the pupils from immigrant origin is
mostly due to their unequal stratification across social strata, and a number of
constraints derived from the migration process. Ethnicity does not seem to
have a major negative impact. On the contrary, the only group that presents a
significant difference with respect to the native population are the
Indochinese, whose sign is positive. This is probably due to the very particular
nature of the Indochinese fluxes that arrived in France19.
With respect to the class independent variables, all the initial hypotheses are
confirmed here. Both material and cultural disadvantages appear statistically
linked to poorer school performance20. The results obtained in the last model (M3)
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in Table 5 also reject the importance of ethnicity in explaining grades differentials
between ethnic and native groups. After controlling for this set of class variables,
only the Indochinese coefficient remains significant.
Some could argue that ethnicity is only relevant when in combination with low
socio-economic profiles or depending on the family structure (Chiswick, 1988).
Nevertheless, Appendix A includes an expanded version of this model that tried
to find interaction effects with some of the class variables (father’s education,
income, number of siblings and sex – see Table A.3). None of these interactions
were significant21.
The unequal distribution of information about the educational system
The results so far have shown how the ethnic disadvantage in education is
mostly reducible to disadvantage resulting from the immigration process itself.
Therefore, the roots of the statistical effect identified as ethnic disadvantage are
not ethnic-group specific, but common to all immigrant students and their
families. Socio-economic disadvantage is able to account for the largest share of
the ethnic and immigration categories. However, the reasons why first and second
generation immigrants from non-mixed parental couples obtain lower grades than
the natives is still unexplained.
The hypothesis being put forward here is that immigrants, in comparison to
natives, lack the appropriate information about the functioning of the educational
system. This means an extra source of disadvantage that will increase the value of
the discount factor (∂) mentioned at the beginning of this paper. To test this
hypothesis, an index consisting of three indicators that measure the information
that parents have about the educational system was constructed. The value given
to the variable information ranges from 0 (i.e., the family scores 0 in all three
indicators) to 3 (i.e., the family scores 1 in all three indicators). This index was
created using data about school choice behaviour and parents-teachers relations22.
These two variables have specific importance given the particularities of the
French educational system, especially in secondary education. The three
indicators of the index were:
• School choice behaviour is a good proxy for parental information about the
school system. Freedom of school choice is thought to increase class
inequalities in education because more advantaged families profit from their
greater knowledge of the school system to place their offspring in better
positions (Coleman, Schiller & Scheneider, 1993). In France, the debate about
the normative desirability of the recognition of the right to choose any school
was central during the 1980s and the 1990s (Ballion, 1986). Nowadays this
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right is widely recognised. One of its main consequences has been the
existence of a rating of school desirability leading to schools ranging along a
continuum depending on their attributes23. School prestige is highly
appreciated by higher education institutions. Notions about school prestige
concern not only academic success, but also the type of individuals attending
the institution (Felouzis, 2003). A higher score was given in the index to those
families that sent their child to schools for academic reasons, namely, its
prestige, the general academic level and the socio-economic profile of its
public24.
• The existence of an adequate parents-teachers relation is central for the
conformation of realistic family’s wishes about the children’s education,
which is in turn of key importance in the so-called orientation process at the
end of lower secondary school. The information index is higher for those
students whose parents met teachers at least once in 1998 – the only available
register in Panel 95.
• It is obvious that parental involvement in the class council may lead to better
information about the school system in general and the selective process at the
end of lower secondary education in particular. Although, over time, huge
efforts have been made to simplify this selective process, it remains obscure
to many students and their families (Masson, 1997).
It is not being suggested here that school choice and parents-teachers
relations directly affect attainment through mechanisms such as school effects.
The point is simply that these imply a more sophisticated level of information
about the educational system that allows parents to channel their offspring
towards the more realistic tracks according to their academic outcomes in lower
secondary school25.
Finally, one more control was added to the information argument due to
the specific handicaps that first generation immigrants face. These are related
to the problematic transferability of human capital which have already
been mentioned. This seems to have a particularly important effect on
educational attainment (Chiswick & DebBurman, 2004). This addition will
obviously also increase the value of ∂ for first generation immigrant students.
The variable student-arrival registers the student’s year of arrival in France.
Logically, the hypothesis behind this variable is that the closer this date is to
1995 (when the student began his or her lower secondary education), the
worse the student’s school performance is likely to be. The results are given in
Table 6.
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As can be seen in the second model (M2), the introduction of the information
argument and the passage of time since the student’s arrival eliminate significant
differences between the students from immigrant parental couples and natives.
The time since arrival effect is only significant when it is interacted with the first-
immigrant coefficient (although, in this case, its level of significance is only
p < .10). Thus, the mixed type parental couples cancels the handicap linked to
TABLE 6: OLS – grades in French in the evaluation examinations (ii)
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recent arrival in the host country. After controlling for all these variables, none
of the immigration categories remains significant.
Conclusions
This paper, which explored the existing relationships between class,
immigration and ethnicity, has proved the correctness of a non-ethnic approach to
the study of the educational differentials of immigrants and natives. Few traces of
ethnic disadvantage were detected. As the empirical evidence provided here
indicates, after controlling for immigration related variables, ethnicity, if
anything, has a positive effect. Most of what can be identified with an ‘ethnic
effect’ is actually linked to the status of being an immigrant – a source of
disadvantage that operates across ethnic borders. Within the group of immigrant
students, those coming from mixed parental couples are clearly better off. The
effect of being born in the host country or abroad is also a key factor, although less
important than the type of parental couple.
Controlling for the perceived degree of academic success (i.e., school results),
the immigrant families are slightly more prone to prefer the vocational track than
the natives. But this is an immigration effect, not an ethnic one. Ethnicity does not
have an impact in these processes. In any case, there were no statistically
significant differences across ethnic or immigration categories in the track that a
student is invited to follow as a result of the selective process that takes place at
the end of lower secondary school. The initial differences in access to the
academic or the vocational tracks in upper secondary school are simply a function
of the academic performance in the lower secondary school. This is true for both
natives and immigrants.
A statistically significant gap separates the school performance of students
across ethnic minorities. This is mostly absorbed by the immigration status
categories. Following that, class related mechanisms explain most of the
unexplained variance. Two further elements account for the remaining negative
effect of the immigrant students coming from non-mixed types of parental
families. First, the impact that migration represents for young first-movers
requires the passage of time in order to reach the natives’ level of academic
performance. The second element, which is specific to first movers, is that
immigrant families have a deficient knowledge of the educational system. This
mechanism is not immigration-specific. It operates equally for immigrants and for
French-born families, but it affects immigrant families in a bigger proportion. This
is why the students coming from immigrant + immigrant types of parental couples
are more disadvantaged.
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To conclude, the role of ethnicity in the explanation of the educational
disadvantage of immigrants is at best modest. In no case could ethnicity be
understood as a constraining factor. On the contrary, most of the times it was non-
significant or positive. The mechanisms producing what is frequently known as
ethnic disadvantage are not really an ethnic effect. This is due to the combination
of immigration related mechanisms – including a lack of country specific
knowledge – and the unequal stratification of immigrants across class segments.
Thus, the recent proliferation of theories focusing on the essential role of ethnicity
on educational attainment should be revised. Theoretical work in this field of
research needs to look for more straightforward and parsimonious explanations.
Notes
  1. Although some authors have argued that cultural capital is a construct that is culturally biased in
its definition in favour of natives (Driesen & Geert, 2001), its inclusion in the study of the
educational performance of immigrants and ethnic minorities seems very appropriate (Kalmijn
& Kraaykamp, 1996).
  2. As the answer rate decreased dramatically in the second part of the ‘family questionnaire’, Panel
95 includes appropriate weights (POND1 and POND2) to avoid this loss of cases (Caille, 2003).
  3. That is, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein, Belgium,
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Monaco.
  4. The former territory of Indochina was a French colony. After the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu,
this territory was split into three different independent states (i.e., Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia).
  5. That is, Liberia, The Gambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zaire, Ecuadorian Guinea,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Benin,
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Lion, Sudan, Chad, Togo, The Zambia, Botswana,
Lesotho, Mauricio Island, Swaziland, Bissau Guinea, Mozambique, Saint Tome and Prince,
Angola, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles Islands and Djibouti.
  6. But some scholars have also argued that immigrants and ethnic minorities are more often
orientated towards the academic track than natives (Vallet & Caille, 1996; Felouzis, 2003).
  7. The correlation between this variable and the mean score obtained in the brevet examinations
(which takes place at the end of lower secondary school) is over 0.65. This proves the quality of
this variable. In any case, with or without the inclusion of the mean-brevet, the results shown in
Table 3 do not change. The fact that the mean-brevet and the level-family-estimation is not bigger
proves that there are information problems existing among certain type of families. The
correlation for the immigrant families is, for example, 0.4126.
  8. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that there are no significant interaction effects with the ethnic
groups and the income variable. This rejects the possibility that ethnic constraints exist only in
the lower social strata, but not in the privileged ones. Interactions were also tried with the family’s
estimated level of student’s success to see if certain ethnic groups are more risk averse than others.
This possibility was also rejected.
  9. This effect disappears after controlling for parental time of residence in France. This is not
presented here because it does not contradict the argument made in this paper. These results are
available upon request. The results are also robust after controlling for parental education.
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10. These models are available upon request.
11. Note that the pseudo-R2 rises by some 15 percentage points when the mean score in the brevet
examinations and the number of repeated years are introduced in the model specification. After
that, when the family’s choice is included, it rises to 56% of explained variance.
12. Again, Table A.2 in Appendix A rejects the existence of significant interactions between the
ethnic membership and the family’s expressed option. This means that no ethnic group’s
environment is especially supportive of the less academic options.
13. These models are available upon request.
14. While mathematics is more informative about the student’s cognitive abilities, language is more
graphic for general cultural background (Dronkers & Robert, 2003).
15. The one in mathematics is the mean of the scores in algebra, numeration and decimal numeration,
numeric problems and geometry. The one in French language includes the results of reading
comprehension, text production and expression and code knowledge.
16. The results obtained in mathematics simply confirmed the conclusions drawn from the analysis
that are presented in this paper. The author decided to use the grades obtained at the beginning
of lower secondary school instead of the results of the brevet examinations because the
frequencies are higher for these initial tests than for the brevet. Further analysis showed that the
rate of progress throughout lower secondary school is not different between immigrants and
natives (these models are available upon request).
17. The values given were: 1 – no education; 2 – primary; 3 – brevet des collèges (lower secondary
school); 4 – vocational upper secondary (CAP/CAPA and BEP/BEPA); 5 – general and
technological (BAC); 6 – university (1st, 2nd and 3rd cycles).
18. Given that educational homogamy is common in the dataset (correlation between father’s and
mother’s education is 0.6), and in order to avoid multi-collinearity problems, only the father’s
education is introduced in the models.
19. The fluxes of Cambodian, Laotian and Vietnamese immigrants present a very qualified profile
with few of them coming from rural backgrounds (Tribalat, 1995).
20. Bear in mind that these results are stable after controlling for a number of ethnic specific variables
such as the language spoken with children, ethnic capital (Borjas, 1992) and the different
operationalisations for the first-movers modes of incorporation (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). None
of these variables had a significant effect. No results were detected among the set of variables
included in the models shown in this paper.
21. There are three exceptions to this statement. First, the interaction between the Portuguese
coefficient and the level of father’s education is significantly negative. This result contradicts the
common wisdom in the French specialised literature on ethnicity that tends to present the
Portuguese as a group that benefits from its positive ethnic background, most of the times in
contradiction with the Algerians for whom the ethnic environment is thought to have negative
effects (see Tribalat, 1995). The second exception comes from the African group and its
interaction with the number of siblings, for whom the interactive parameter is positive, meaning
that the Africans brought up in bigger families obtain better school results. This finding
contradicts the widely negative effect of larger family sizes. Finally, in the model where sex is
the interacted variable, the Portuguese girls seem to be better off than the boys. None of these
significant effects seem to be in agreement with the predictions of the cultural literature on the
constraining effect of ethnicity.
22. Some could argue that these variables capture the effect of parental involvement in education.
This index was built taking six different variables of parental involvement: (i) frequency of talks
about life in class; (ii) frequency of talks about academic and professional future; (iii) help with
homework; (iv) parents-teachers relations; (v) involvement in the class council; and (vi) reasons
for school choice. A principal component analysis indicated that these variables belong to two
different dimensions. The first dimension – that is, involvement at the school level – linked
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parents-teachers relations, involvement in the class council and school choice. The other three
variables belong to a different dimension, which corresponds to parental involvement in
education in the most intimate sphere. The results of these analyses are available upon request.
23. These attributes can be ascriptive (e.g., tradition, area, and range of study options) or signs of
academic success (e.g., number of students that repeated grades and selection into upper
secondary school).
24. Out of all the possible reasons for choosing a school included in Panel 95, these three dimensions
appear to be reducible to a single dimension. The results of the principal component analysis that
proves this are available upon request.
25. For example, with respect to school choice, Ballion (1986) points out that the bad or good
reputation of certain schools is, with some exceptions, an imaginary representation based on
rumours and partial impressions. With respect to the effect of meeting teachers, the link with
information can be more evident. This is particularly important in lower secondary school
because of the obscurity and complexity of the orientation process (Masson, 1997).
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